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Constitutionality of D.C.
Mortmain Statute Avoided;
D.C. Laws Not "Statutes of the
United States"

institutions and to charities by individuals
who make improvident dispositions in apprehension and contemplation of death.
The salient characterisitc of the provision in question is the classification
scheme that it establishes. If a testator
devises property to a religious organization, and the testator fails to survive the
execution of the will by thirty days, the
devise is null and void. However, as noted
by the lower court in French, "gifts to
charitable, educational and artistic

By J. Michael Dougherty, Jr.

organizations, even though operated by
In a 5-4 decision, Key v. Doyle (Estate
of French), 98 S. Ct. 280 (1977), the

The facts before the court showed that
a District of Columbia woman executed a

religious institutions, have been held to
be beyond the aegis of the statute." Key v.
Doyle (Estate of French) 365 A.2d 621

Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because the Court con

will in which she left one-third of her
residuary estate to the Calvary Baptist

(D.C. App. 1976). As a result of the D.C.

cluded that the Mortmain provision of the
D.C. Code which was held unconstitu-

Church and one-third to St. Matthew's
Cathedral. Twenty days after the execu-

Code

tional by the District of Columbia Court

tion of the will, the testatrix died. Subse

of Appeals was not a statute of the United
States. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court

quently, the executor instituted this suit

never ruled on the merits of the case, an

of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia in light of D.C. Code § 18-302

seeking a ruling from the Probate Division

provision,

two categories

of

beneficiaries developed: one category
consisting of religious devises and be
quests and another category of devises
and bequests to nonreligious benefici-

(1973). The code provides: "A devise or

aries. Since this classification did not involve a "suspect class," the D.C. Court of
Appeals applied the rational relation test

bequest of real or personal property to..

to the case.

a religious sect, order, or denomination,
or to or for the support, use, or benefit

Under the rational relation examination, the court analyzed the statutory

thereof.., is not valid unless it is made at

classification to see whether it rationally
related to a legitimate governmental ob-

statute, the D.C. Court of Appeals struck
down the statute because it was found ir-

least 30 days before the death of the
testator." The purpose of this statute,
commonly known as a "Mortmain

rational and arbitrary.

statute," is to invalidate gifts to religious

examination of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals' decision is appropriate.

MORTMAIN STATUTE
When confronted with the basic issue of
the constitutionality of the D.C. Mortmain
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jective. The court ruled that classifications created by section 18-302 were ar
bitrary and unreasonable. The law created
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I
a loophole by establishing a distinction
between gifts to religious organizations
and gifts to charitable organizations
owned and operated by religious institutions, with only the latter valid. Key v.
Doyle (Estate of French) 365 A.2d at
624. Since the court found dissimilar
treatment for similarly situated beneficiaries and no rational relationship between
the law and the governmental objective,
the statute was ruled unconstitutional for
denying the religious legatees the equal
protection-due process guarantees of the
fifth amendment.
As a result of the D.C. Court of Appeals' decision, the testatrix's heirs and
next-of-kin appealed to the Supreme
Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1257(1) (1970). This provision authorizes
appeals to the Supreme Court in cases
"where is drawn in question the validity
of a ... statute of the United States and
the decision is against its validity." The
Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Stewart
speaking for the majority, dismissed the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction,
based on its determination that the District of Columbia Code provision, applicable only in the district, was not a "statute

The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the 1970 act, which restructured the District of Columbia courts and their jurisdiction, is that the Congress did not intend
the act to enlarge the right of appeal to
the Supreme Court from the courts of the
district. Congress' objective was that the
District of Columbia courts were to be
viewed as state courts and "[aiccordingly
§ 1257, the jurisdictional provision concerning Supreme Court review of statecourt decisions, was amended to include
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
as the highest court of a state." 98 S. Ct.
at 283. Although the D.C. Court of Ap
peals was made equivalent to the "highest
court of a state," there was no indication
that statutes of the D.C. Code were to be
treated as state statutes. See Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
The majority concluded its decision
stating, by way of analogy, that since
there is no automatic right of appeal to
the Supreme Court when a state court invalidates a state statute on federal
grounds, likewise, there is no right of appeal when a D.C. court annuls a law applicable solely to the District of Columbia.
In such cases, review by the Supreme

of the United States" within the compass
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) (1970). A decision
invalidating a statute of the D.C. Code is

Court will be carried out by writ of certiorari in cognizance of section 1257(3).

not reviewable by direct appeal to the
Supreme Court, but only by writ of certiorari in conformance with 28 U.S.C. §
125703 (1970).

FOUR DISSENT

In its decision, the Supreme Court outlined the ramifications of the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970), and the im
pact of the act on the court system in the
District of Columbia. Prior to the act,
decisions rendered by the local courts of
the District of Columbia were appealable
to the United States Court of Appeals.
When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit invalidated a
state statute, the avenue for the right of
appeal to the Supreme Court was under
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970). When the
validity of statutes applicable solely in the
District of Columbia was challenged, appeal to the Supreme Court was only by
writ of certiorari.

THE FORUM

Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Powell and Mr.
Justice Blackmun, wrote the Court's dissenting opinion. The dissent pointed out
that the 1970 District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
shifted the review of D.C. court judgments from section 1254 to section 1257
and, therefore, expanded the Supreme
Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction.
The dissent stressed that when Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970), it
could have excluded laws applicable to
the District of Columbia, but since Congress did not, "statutes relating to the
District of Columbia would continue to be
viewed as they have in the past, as
statutes of the United States." 98 S.Ct. at
287.
One implication of the majority's deci
sion is that D.C. Code provisions are in
legalistic limbo. The D.C. statutes have

been uniquely categorized as being
neither statutes of a state nor statutes of
the United States. The dissent noted that
if Congress, with its constitutional power
to legislate for the District of Columbia
under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, had wanted
such an interpretation of the D.C. Code,
Congress would have made it clear in previous legislative acts. In summation, Mr.
Justice White's dissent stated that the majority's narrow construction of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 will result in a
lessening of the Court's work load. The
dissent reprimands the majority for enacting self -legislation since an objective of
lessening the work load "should be effectuated by statutory amendment, not
strained construction." 98 S.Ct. at 289.
IMPLICATION OF DECISION
In that the Supreme Court declined to
address the merits of the case before it,
the D.C. Court of Appeals decision, ruling
the district's Mortmain statute unconstitutional, was left intact. Since the Supreme
Court's pronouncement means that no
higher court has reviewed the merits of
the decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals
by either appeal or by writ of certiorari,
more litigation involving Mortmain
statutes is imminent. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in In re Estate of Cavill,
459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974), ruled
that since the Pennsylvania Mortmain
statute failed to satisfy the rational relationship test and therefore denied
beneficiaries the equal protection of the
laws, the statute was unconstitutional. Six
other states (Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Mississippi, Ohio, and Montana) have
Mortmain statutes similar to the District
of Columbia's section 18 302 except that
none of these is restricted to religious bequests. Since the states do have power to
regulate testamentary dispositions, the
latest developments

must be balanced
against the fact that it is sound public
policy to prevent the testator from making improvident dispositions of his prop
erty when he is in a weakened mental condition and is unable to deliberate calmly
the needs of his family.
The Supreme Court is certain to be presented with the Mortmain statute con-

